Technical Support for Nuclear Diplomacy
Problems in nuclear proliferation can pose new kinds of technical challenge for policy experts. LNSP provides ad-hoc analyses relevant to ongoing policy discussions or diplomacy to support decision making in government.
Can the Iran Deal be Verified?
In 2014, U.S. lawmakers asked whether the Joint Comprehensive Plant of Action (JCPOA) or "Iran Deal" would provide verifiable assurances that Iran is not engaged in a covert nuclear-weapons program. The situation has no historical analogue. LNSP helped analyze the facts.
- R. Scott Kemp, Verifying an agreement between Iran and the E3+3, LNSP Occasional Paper, November 2014.
Redesigning the Arak Reactor
LNSP was among the first groups to produce a viable proposal for modifying the Arak Heavy Water reactor to a configuration that would reduce its production of plutonium. Iran later adopted the conversion of its reactor as part of its negotiated settlement with the E3+3 that became part of the JCPOA.
- R. Scott Kemp “Two Methods for Converting a Heavy-Water Research Reactor to Use Low-Enriched-Uranium Fuel to Improve Proliferation Resistance After Startup.” Energy Technology & Policy, vol. 2, no. 1 (January 2015): 39–46.
Evaluating The Efficacy of U.S. Cyber Attacks as a Counterproliferation Strategy
Cyber attack against Iran's Nuclear Program formed a central part of the U.S. counterproliferation effort prior to the negotiation of the JCPOA. This novel strategy appeared extremely appealing for avoiding kinetic force, but it had not been tried before. Although widely lauded as a short-lived success, LNSP's analysis of the strategy argues that the attack may have had the opposite of the desired effect, suggesting a more cautious approach to cyber interventions might be warranted in the future.
- R. Scott Kemp, "Cyberweapons: Bold steps in a digital darkness," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 6, 2012.