Technical Support for Nuclear Diplomacy

Iran has been the primary proliferation concern for more than a decade, where its centrifuge-based enrichment program posed a new kind of challenge for nonproliferation experts. In 2010, LNSP principal investigator R. Scott Kemp helped the U.S. government navigate the technicalities of the program as the State Department's Science Advisor in the Office of the Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control. This work continues at LNSP.

Can the Iran Deal be Verified?

As the November 2014 deadline for a deal nears, lawmakers are wise to ask whether the deal can provide verifiable assurances that Iran is not engaged in a covert nuclear-weapons program. The situation has no historical analogue. LNSP helps analyze the facts.

Redesigning the Arak Reactor

LNSP was among the first groups to produce a viable proposal for modifying the Arak Heavy Water reactor to a configuration that would reduce its production of plutonium. Since then, Iran has adopted the conversion of its reactor as part of its negotiated settlement with the E3+3.

Evaluating The Efficacy of U.S. Cyber Attacks as a Counterproliferation Strategy

Cyber attack against Iran's Nuclear Program formed a central part of the U.S. counterproliferation effort. This novel strategy appeared extremely appealing for its lack of force, but it had not been tried before. Although widely lauded as a short-lived success, LNSP's careful analysis of the strategy shows that the attack may have had the opposite of the desired effect, suggesting a more cautious approach to cyber interventions might be warranted in the future.