Natalie Montoya
Laboratory for Nuclear Security and Policy, MIT
Abstract:
Simulations of nuclear attacks are a valuable assessment tool to analyze the capabilities of arsenals in order to inform policies, budgets, and negotiations. For this project, targeting strategies were developed for scenarios of a Russian first strike, Russian second strike with strategic warning, and Russian second strike without strategic warning, utilizing the full Russian arsenal for the first strike but only the arsenal expected to survive a U.S. first strike with and without warning for the second strikes. To determine the composition of those surviving arsenals, simulations were coded and run to assess the survivability of the Russian mobile ICBMs and both countries’ silos. In addition to standard counterforce targets, the scenarios included counter-recovery targets consisting of oil refineries and pipelines, shipping ports, and high voltage (HV) transformers to eliminate the U.S. supply of petroleum products and blackout the electrical grid. Beyond infrastructure damage, the blast fatalities and injuries were calculated using NUKEMAP. Though varying in values, all three scenarios resulted in catastrophic damages and highlighted areas for further consideration. This study showed that deep arsenal reductions are possible while maintaining deterrence, the role and necessity of the U.S. ICBMs should be evaluated, and grid security and oil dependence should be addressed.
Bio:
Natalie Montoya is a Technical Associate in the Laboratory for Nuclear Security and Policy in the Department of Nuclear Science & Engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Previously, Natalie was the 2021 – 2022 James C. Gaither Junior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She holds a Bachelor’s degree in nuclear engineering with minors in energy studies and Japanese from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.