Benjamin Jung

RWTH Aachen University

Zoom link: https://mit.zoom.us/j/91794151221

Abstract:

Like the non-proliferation regime today, future nuclear disarmament efforts will likely have to deal with stockpiles of weapons-usable fissile material and the verification of declarations about these stockpiles. To support such verification tasks, nuclear archaeology offers scientific methods to reconstruct the operational history of nuclear facilities. The Bayesian Reprocessing waste Analysis Method (BRAM) is a promising new approach that attempts to reconstruct information about the operating history of a nuclear reactor from reprocessing waste samples using a Bayesian inference framework. Given some prior information, computational reactor models and measurements of isotopic ratios in the reprocessing waste, the Bayesian framework reconstructs a posterior probability distribution for parameters of interest such as average burnup, initial enrichment and cooling time of the fuel.

Our simulation-based tests demonstrate the potential of this method to reconstruct the parameters even when the reactor of origin is unknown or when waste from different core charges has been mixed. We demonstrate possible applications of the framework in a simulated case study of the North Korean 5 MWe reactor. Although further testing with real measurement data is required to understand the challenges and associated uncertainties, our results demonstrate the potential insights that this framework can provide and how it can contribute to the verification of fissile material declarations.

Bio:

Benjamin Jung is a doctoral student in physics at RWTH Aachen University and works as a research associate at the Technical University of Darmstadt. His research interests are arms control verification, nuclear archaeology, and statistical inference. Benjamin is currently working on developing new nuclear archaeology methods for reconstructing reactor operating histories from samples of nuclear reprocessing waste.

Eli Sanchez

MIT Security Studies Program

Zoom link: https://mit.zoom.us/j/93818875228

Abstract

Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) have long been considered invulnerable to disarming strikes due to their weak detectable signatures and the large areas within which they could hold an adversary’s high value assets at risk. Defeating a fleet of highly sophisticated SSBNs before they can launch retaliatory strikes would require a massive, coordinated search effort that is widely believed to be far beyond the capabilities of modern national actors. For this reason, SSBNs have long been considered highly secure second strike forces, and thus a strong deterrent against initiating nuclear war.

However, for roughly the past decade a growing number of analysts have suggested that several strands of emerging technology may soon conspire to render SSBNs vulnerable to disarming strikes. These technologies include novel sensing modalities; uncrewed autonomous vehicles; and advanced computing techniques, particularly artificial intelligence (AI). These analysts worry that such technologies will undermine the foundations of nuclear deterrence, with immense implications for geopolitical security.

This study conducts a broad survey of the sensing technologies most often cited in this discourse. It provides high-level discussions and order-of-magnitude analyses of the relevant technical aspects of each to assess their potential to enhance SSBN detection. The technologies considered in the study include quantum sensors, artificial intelligence (AI), space-based sensors, advanced acoustic sensors, and laser detection (light detection and ranging, or LiDAR).

It is concluded that most of these technologies will not offer any meaningful improvement in SSBN detection, either because they do not address current technical limitations (as in the case of quantum sensors and advanced acoustic sensors) or they would require technological advances far exceeding what appears plausible in the foreseeable future (as in the case of space-based sensors and LiDAR). It is found that the most promising approach to enhancing SSBN detection is the application of AI algorithms to passive sonar signal processing. However, the capabilities that have been demonstrated by the relevant AI algorithms in the unclassified literature are suggestive of evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, advances in SSBN detection.

Bio

Eli Sanchez grew up in Smithville, TX, a small town roughly midway between Houston and Austin. He received his bachelor’s degree in Chemistry with a minor in Physics from the University of Texas at Dallas. He then worked for a year at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, where he used computational models to study the effects of radiation exposure on the human body, before beginning his PhD in the Nuclear Science and Engineering Department at MIT. His doctoral research assessed the implications of hypersonic boost-glide weapons for great power strategic stability. He is now a postdoctoral Nuclear Security Fellow at the Security Studies Program at MIT where he studies the potential for emerging technologies to increase the vulnerability of ballistic missile submarines.

Christopher Lawrence

Georgetown University

Zoom link: https://mit.zoom.us/j/96534475122

Abstract

Scholars of nuclear brinkmanship have long debated whether nuclear crises are dominated by a balance of resolve, or whether nuclear superiority may offset that balance in favor of the more technologically advanced competitor. Recent studies indicate the latter, suggesting that the high accuracy of modern strategic weapons may have ushered in a “new era of counterforce dominance.” The state that masters those weapons, they argue, can steel their resolve if they become confident in their ability to eliminate an adversary’s retaliatory nuclear forces in a disarming first strike. Yet counterforce enthusiasts overlook an important technological headwind: the complexity of advanced weapon systems can confound nuclear planners’ ability to predict their performance in a real nuclear exchange. This challenge is particularly acute for counterforce systems that cannot be tested in operational settings, and whose failure would bring catastrophic consequences on their user. I analyze the uncertainty of counterforce operations by constructing a Monte Carlo simulation of a counterforce strike with modern US strategic missiles on China’s silo-based missile force. I show that small variations in parameters that cannot be known to the attacker with certainty correspond to wide variation in strike outcomes. The resulting uncertainty in costs to the attacker complicates popular strategic theories of damage limitation.

Bio

Christopher Lawrence is Assistant Professor of Science, Technology and Nuclear Security at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. He obtained his PhD in nuclear science and engineering at University of Michigan, and held postdoctoral positions at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation; the Belfer Center at Harvard University; and the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University. His research has appeared in International Security, Social Studies of Science and Journal of Applied Physics.

Lucas Arthur

Laboratory for Nuclear Science and Policy, MIT

Zoom link: https://mit.zoom.us/j/99727454497

Abstract:

I present the results of Monte Carlo simulations of guidance errors for ballistic missiles in the near-Earth environment. Based on these simulations, I survey the applications and limitations of inertial navigation and global navigation satellite systems for missile guidance and analyze the contribution of each source of guidance error to the total miss distance, with and without maneuverability during the reentry phase. These results provide evidence that modern guidance technology with maneuverable reentry vehicles may enable reductions in ballistic missile warhead yield and arsenal size, without reducing overall system efficacy.

Bio:

Lucas Arthur is a Technical Associate in the Laboratory for Nuclear Security and Policy in the Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering at MIT. He received his SB in physics with a minor in political science from MIT in 2021. His primary research interests center around the use of numerical simulations and probabilistic algorithms for inference, data analysis, and inverse problems. Much of his recent work has focused on assessing the accuracy of intercontinental ballistic missiles, simulating reentry vehicles, and characterizing the performance of inertial and satellite-based guidance and navigation systems.

Laura Kahn

One Health Initiative

Abstract

In her talk, One Health and the Politics of COVID-19, Dr. Kahn unpacks the mysteries of COVID-19’s origins. The One Health concept recognizes the interconnected links among the health of humans, animals, plants, and the environment. By comparing the history, science, and clinical presentations of three different coronaviruses—SARS-CoV-1, MERS, and SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19)—she uncovers insights with important repercussions for how to prepare and avoid future pandemics. The One Health approach provides a useful framework for examining the COVID-19 pandemic. Understanding the origins of this pandemic requires investigating the environmental and molecular biological factors that allowed the virus to spread to humans. She examines the biosafety, biosecurity, and bioethics implications of gain-of-function research on pandemic potential pathogens.

Bio

For almost 15 years, Laura H. Kahn, a physician, was a research scholar with the Program on Science and Global Security at the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University. She is a co-founder of the One Health Initiative, a global movement that promotes the health of all species. She is the author of, Who’s in Charge? Leadership during epidemics, bioterror attacks, and other public health crises, originally published in 2009 by Praeger Security International. In 2020, a second edition was issued with a new preface discussing leadership during the COVID-19 pandemic. Her second book, One Health and the Politics of Antimicrobial Resistance, was published in June 2016 by Johns Hopkins University Press. In 2014, the American Association of Public Health Physicians awarded her with a Presidential Award for Meritorious Service, and in 2016, the American Veterinary One Health Society awarded her with their highest honor, the K.F. Meyer-James H. Steele Gold Head Cane Award, for her work in One Health. One Health and the Politics of Covid-19, her second book in the One Health series, was recently published in October 2024 by Johns Hopkins University press.

Max Schalz

RWTH Aachen University

Zoom link: https://mit.zoom.us/j/91217338038

Abstract

Nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) simulations are routinely used in civilian nuclear programmes to model, e.g., energy transition scenarios. So far, they have not been established in the non-proliferation and verification field despite their potential benefits.

In this talk, I present Bicyclus, a software aimed at simulating and analysing NFCs in a non-proliferation context. After briefly introducing the technical background and the different fissile material production paths, I focus on two application cases. In the first scenario, the NFC simulations are used to independently assess the fissile material production of Pakistan. In the second, so-called nuclear archaeology scenario, I show how the simulations can be combined with measurement data to reconstruct the past fissile material production of a nuclear programme.

Bio

Max Schalz is a PhD student in physics and a researcher at the Nuclear Verification and Disarmament research group at RWTH Aachen University. In his research, he develops simulation software to model fissile material stockpiles of nuclear weapon states. In particular, he combines these simulations with measurements of nuclear waste to reconstruct past fissile material production, and to verify declarations made by nuclear operators or states. In addition to his technical research, he frequently engages in policy work and public outreach activities.

David Wright

MIT Laboratory for Nuclear Security and Policy

Zoom link: https://mit.zoom.us/j/91993642635

Abstract

Hypersonic weapons are missiles that travel with speeds greater than Mach 5 and use atmospheric forces to glide at low altitudes. Boost-glide vehicles (BGV) use rocket boosters to reach high speeds and then glide unpowered to their targets. Hypersonic cruise missiles (HCM) are also boosted to high speeds but use an engine called a scramjet to provide power during part of the atmospheric flight. The US, Russia, and China are all developing both BGVs and HCMs.

This talk will give an introduction to scramjets and explain why integrating them into hypersonic weapons constrains the operation of these weapons in ways that limit their utility compared to other types of weapons for the same missions. As part of that analysis, we model the X-51A HCM vehicle that the United States flight tested in 2010-13, and use that model as a basis for assessing the potential performance of near-term HCMs for military use. We conclude that while scramjets, which are not a mature technology, may become useful for space-launch and possibly other applications, they are not well-suited to hypersonic weapons.

Bio

David Wright is a researcher in the MIT Laboratory for Nuclear Security and Policy. From 1992 to 2020 he was a researcher with the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, serving as co-director of the program from 2002 to 2020. Previously he held research positions in the Defense and Arms Control/Security Studies Program at MIT, the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, and the Federation of American Scientists. He received his PhD in theoretical condensed matter physics from Cornell University in 1983 and worked as a research physicist until 1988. From 1990 to 2019, he was a primary organizer of the International Summer Symposiums on Science and World Affairs, which fostered cooperation among scientists around the world working on arms control and security issues. In 2001, he was a co-recipient of the American Physical Society’s Joseph A. Burton Forum Award for his arms control research and his work with international scientists. He is a Fellow of the American Physical Society.

Sulgiye Park

Union of Concerned Scientists

Zoom link: https://mit.zoom.us/j/98987475871

Abstract

North Korea is rapidly developing its nuclear arsenal and military capabilities. The ongoing missile testing and increased activities at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center—the main hub for North Korea’s nuclear program—suggest that it remains committed to advancing and continuing its nuclear weapons program. This commitment aligns with Kim’s statement at the end of 2022 to “exponentially increase the country’s nuclear arsenal,” and to expand the production of weapons-grade nuclear materials. Since the production of these fissile materials is often the bottleneck in nuclear weapons production, it is imperative to understand North Korea’s capacity for producing fissile materials. This work examines the technical capacities that underpin Kim’s remarks on exponentially increasing North Korea’s nuclear arsenal by examining ongoing operations at Yongbyon and providing an independent analysis of potential plutonium production.

Bio

Sulgiye Park is a senior scientist at the Union of Concerned Scientists, where she specializes in North Korea and China’s nuclear fuel pathway. She received her Ph.D. in Geological Sciences at Stanford University, where her work focused on the behavior of nuclear materials under extreme environments. After her Ph.D., she worked at the Stanford Institute of Materials and Energy Sciences (SIMES) as a materials scientist, where her work involved fabricating nanodiamonds for various technological applications. She was a recipient of a Jamieson Award for her work at SIMES. Dr. Park then received a Stanton and MacArthur Nuclear Security Fellowships at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). At CISAC, she worked on various projects, including looking at the front end of North Korea’s fuel cycle, monitoring North Korea and China’s economic trade activities, as well as examining the regulatory framework on nuclear waste management, particularly concerning advanced nuclear reactors.

Astrid Kause (Leuphana University) and Moritz Kütt (University of Hamburg)

Zoom link: https://mit.zoom.us/j/93550633491

Abstract

Nearly 75 years ago, physicist Niels Bohr addressed the United Nations with a remarkable letter. He outlined the necessity for free scientific exchange as a precondition for a more peaceful world. In our talk, we re-examine Bohr’s proposition under today’s circumstances, looking in particular at the global challenges of nuclear weapons and climate change. Speaking together as a psychologist and a physicist, we practice openness across disciplinary fields in science. We will make recommendations for increased openness in science, addressing the global scientific community as well as diverse public audiences, and illustrate those using examples from our own research work.

Bios

Astrid Kause is an assistant professor of Sustainability Science and Psychology at Leuphana University of Lüneburg. She is associated with Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security and Behavioral Science for Policy Lab, as well as with the Harding Center for Risk Literacy at the University of Potsdam (Germany). Using methods from psychology and decision research, she studies the cognitive and social mechanisms driving risk perception and decision-making under uncertainty. She explores those in the context of climate change, biodiversity loss as well as nuclear weapons and nuclear war. Drawing on the science of science communication, her research also explores how risks and uncertainties can be communicated transparently and understandably. Her work aims to make citizens better able to deal with risk and uncertainty.

Moritz Kütt leads the Working Group “Science and Disarmament” within the research area “Arms Control and Emerging Technologies” at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH). He is also a Visiting Research Scholar with Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security as a Visiting Research Scholar. Since March 2023, Moritz has been a member of the Scientific Advisory Group of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. His research focus is the elimination of nuclear weapon programs. In his research projects, he covers aspects starting from the prevention of nuclear war and effects of nuclear weapons, over the control of nuclear weapon-related fissile material and the verification of nuclear weapon dismantlement to the mitigation of the legacy of nuclear weapons.

Tom Stefanick

Brookings Institution

Zoom link: https://mit.zoom.us/j/92028919066

Abstract

With substantial numbers of Chinese and Russian strategic forces based on SSBNs and the majority of US warheads deployed on SSBNs, the question of survivability remains an important question. Several authors have asserted that the combinations of new technologies such as quantum sensing, artificial intelligence, uncrewed vehicles, etc. will lead to capabilities to threaten SSBN fleets. I offer some analysis to the contrary.

Bio

Tom Stefanick is a Visiting Fellow in the Strobe Talbott Center on Security, Strategy, and Technology at the Brookings Institution, working on military targeting and maritime security. Prior to this position, he was a senior vice president at Metron, Inc. and oversaw business units producing algorithms, autonomous systems, and simulation models for the Department of Defense. He worked in the House Armed Services Committee in 1987 and 1988 on Soviet submarines and strategic antisubmarine warfare after completing a book on that topic.

Timur Kadyshev

Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH), University of Hamburg

Zoom link: https://mit.zoom.us/j/95663169859

Abstract

After the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, missile defense systems became more prominent and sought after on a global scale. Germany has recently decided to purchase the Arrow system developed by Israel. This report derives technical capabilities of the system based on publicly available information, with a focus on the Arrow 3 interceptor. This information is the basis for an analysis of Arrow’s utility to defend Germany within a larger European context against existing and potential missile threats from Russia. The interceptor’s capabilities are assessed in part using a newly developed Missile Defense Footprint Calculation and Comparison program. The results suggest that Arrow 3, while potentially having impressive capabilities against medium-range ballistic missiles, will be useless against the threats listed as reasons for the German purchase, namely existing Russian ballistic missiles.

Bio

Timur Kadyshev is a Senior Researcher with the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH) at the University of Hamburg conducting independent technical research on ballistic and cruise missiles as well as on missile defense capabilities. His current research focuses on technical and political aspects of missile proliferation and missile defenses, with particular interest to capabilities of missile defenses and their effects on the global and regional military balances. Previously he worked as a Research Consultant at Princeton University’s Science and Global Security Program. Before that he worked as a Senior Research Scientist at the Moscow’s Center for Arms Control, Energy, and Environmental Studies, where he conducted research and supervised a course on Technical Aspects of Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. He spent an academic year of 2001/02 as a Science Fellow at Stanford University’s CISAC, and early in his career worked as a Research Fellow at the Defense and Arms Control Studies program at MIT.

Julien de Troullioud de Lanversin

Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

Zoom link: https://mit.zoom.us/j/98115087408

Abstract:

While the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban treaty (CTBT) bans nuclear weapon test explosions, it does not define what a nuclear explosion is. The U.S. interpretation of the treaty is that any test involving a supercritical chain reaction is prohibited; this is the “zero-yield” standard. Very low-yield nuclear tests release million times less energy than full-scale nuclear test explosions and are conducted in metallic containment vessels. Subcritical very low-yield tests that the U.S. regularly conducts for its stockpile stewardship are allowed according to the “zero-yield” standard.

In the past, however, countries have conducted very low-yield tests involving supercritical chain reactions, such as the hydronuclear tests conducted by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The U.S. has recently accused Russia and China of violating the “zero-yield” standard by conducting such tests.

There is currently no technical method to verify whether a very low-yield test was subcritical or supercritical. This seminar presents ongoing work on a new technical method where gamma rays are used to deduce whether a test conducted in the past was supercritical or subcritical. This method relies on on-site measurements of gamma rays emitted by the fission and activation products that are generated during a test and that remain in the containment vessels. Preliminary results have been obtained through computer simulations using open-source neutronics and isotopic software. This work also discusses possible verification protocols based on this method and policy measures that could facilitate onsite inspections of very low-yield tests. Such a verification method could contribute to strengthening adherence to the CTBT and reducing the risks of a resumption of full-scale nuclear tests.

BIO:

Julien is an Assistant Professor at the Division of Public Policy at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST). His research focuses on understanding and addressing the risks that technologies can generate for national and international security, such as nuclear technologies, specifically in the Asia Pacific region and in the context of the U.S-China rivalry. With a background in physics engineering, Julien develops technological solutions to help address global security issues. As the project lead for the nuclear reactor physics code ONIX, Julien also develops open-source software to promote the use of open and transparent scientific tools in academic research and education.

Before joining HKUST, Julien was a fellow at the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard’s Belfer Center from 2021 to 2022 and a nuclear security postdoctoral fellow at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) from 2019 to 2021. He was also part of the Science and Global Security research team at Princeton University from 2014 to 2019. Julien holds a Ph.D. in Applied Physics from Princeton University, an M.Sc. in Nuclear Science and Technology from Tsinghua University Beijing, and a Diplôme d'Ingénieur (M.Sc. and B.Sc.Eng.) from Ecole Centrale de Marseille.

Jake Hecla Dept. of Nuclear Science and Engineering, MIT

Zoom link: https://mit.zoom.us/j/94955805487

Abstract:

The race to build a nuclear-powered aircraft has been described as the high-water mark of Cold War military extravagance: a technology so impractical and inherently dangerous that it could not exist in any other context. However, Russia’s development of the Burevestnik (SSC-X-9 Skyfall), a nuclear-powered cruise missile, suggests some military planners may again envision a role for endo-atmospheric nuclear propulsion.

Patent and publication activity in Russia, as well as in other states, indicates work on air-breathing nuclear propulsion is at a level of activity not seen since the 1950s. Though the developmental histories of these systems are complex, recent innovations in uncrewed systems have removed many of the enduring barriers to developing nuclear-powered flight. Despite the apparent resurgence of interest in endo-atmospheric nuclear propulsion, little work exists exploring key enabling technologies, the signatures associated with nuclear flight, or potential applications in 21st century arsenals. This presentation will provide an overview of the technology of air-breathing nuclear propulsion, a review of past programs, and comments on avenues of research exploring the limits of this exotic form of propulsion.

BIO:

Jake Hecla is a Stanton Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the Laboratory for Nuclear Security and Policy. His research interests focus on emerging technologies, including nuclear thermal propulsion, micro-reactors, and advanced radiation detection techniques. Hecla holds a PhD and MS in nuclear engineering from the University of California, Berkeley and a BS in nuclear science and engineering from MIT.

Tom Stefanick

Brookings Institution

Zoom link: https://mit.zoom.us/j/96339087990

Abstract: The surprising capabilities of deep neural network-based algorithms operating on shared internet data, scientific data, and other collaborative endeavors have been revealed in milestones since around 2012, and are now merging with internet business models. There are also expectations that these computing capabilities will transform warfighting, which is a large part of the motivation for US efforts to choke off China’s high-end semiconductor development. This talk will address some of the reasons why a broad-based transformation of military targeting and weaponry based on these deep learning algorithms is unlikely. These reasons fall into two categories: information limits on detection and estimation in adversarial data environments, and the availability of existing approaches that have been in use and are well-suited to the battlespace environment. I will identify some applications for deep learning that are likely to be useful for US military and intelligence programs.

BIO: Tom Stefanick is a Visiting Fellow in the Strobe Talbott Center on Security, Strategy, and Technology at the Brookings Institution, working on military targeting and maritime security. Prior to this position, he was a senior vice president at Metron, Inc. and oversaw business units producing algorithms, autonomous systems, and simulation models for the Department of Defense. He worked in the House Armed Services Committee in 1987 and 1988 on Soviet submarines and strategic antisubmarine warfare after completing a book on that topic.

Corinne Kramer

Congressional Budget Office (CBO)

Zoom link: https://mit.zoom.us/j/94038928268

Abstract:

The Army, Navy, and Air Force are each developing hypersonic missiles—nonnuclear offensive weapons that fly faster than five times the speed of sound and spend most of their flight in the Earth’s atmosphere. Those missiles are intended to be maneuverable and capable of striking targets quickly (in roughly 15 minutes to 30 minutes) from thousands of kilometers away.

CBO’s analysis of the hypersonic weapons being developed by the U.S. military suggests that while hypersonic missiles are well-suited to operate outside potential adversaries’ anti-¬access and area-denial (A2/AD), or “keep-out,” zones, both hypersonic missiles and ballistic missiles equipped with maneuverable warheads could provide the combination of speed, accuracy, range, and survivability (the ability to reach a target without being intercepted) that would be useful in the military scenarios CBO considered. In addition, several technological challenges remain for development of hypersonic missiles, including management of the extreme heat that they are exposed to by traveling at high speeds in the atmosphere for most of their flight. Hypersonic missiles would probably not be more survivable than ballistic missiles with maneuverable warheads in a conflict, unless the ballistic missiles encountered highly effective long-range defenses, and are likely to cost one-third more than ballistic missiles of the same range with maneuverable warheads.

Bio:

Corinne Kramer is a Principal Analyst in the National Security Division of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). She focuses on technology issues, including hypersonic weapons and space systems. Prior to joining CBO in 2020, Corinne worked for ten years at the Institute for Defense Analyses. Corinne has a PhD in physics from Johns Hopkins University.

Jeffrey Lewis

Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey

Zoom link: https://mit.zoom.us/j/99938358564

Abstract:

Analysts can use open source information to study global missile programs in a much more detailed manner than in the past—not only the missiles themselves, but also the people and facilities involved in their development, testing and manufacture. This talk considers a difficult case—North Korea—and how analysts can use information released as propaganda, satellite imagery, and technical information about missile components and machine tools to understand the development of its Hwasong-17 intercontinental-range ballistic missile.

Bio:

Dr. Jeffrey Lewis is a Professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey and director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Previously, he directed research projects at the New America Foundation and Harvard University. He is a member of the Secretary of State’s International Security Advisory Board.

Dr. Lewis is the author of three books—two scholarly works on China’s nuclear arsenal and a novel, The 2020 Commission on the Nuclear Attacks Against the United States, about a nuclear war with North Korea. His work has been profiled by various media outlets including the Washington Post, New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, Vice and This American Life. He has a BA in Philosophy and Political Science from Augustana College in Rock Island, Illinois and a PhD in Policy Studies from the University of Maryland, College Park.

Natalie Montoya

Laboratory for Nuclear Security and Policy, MIT

Zoom link

Abstract:

Simulations of nuclear attacks are a valuable assessment tool to analyze the capabilities of arsenals in order to inform policies, budgets, and negotiations. For this project, targeting strategies were developed for scenarios of a Russian first strike, Russian second strike with strategic warning, and Russian second strike without strategic warning, utilizing the full Russian arsenal for the first strike but only the arsenal expected to survive a U.S. first strike with and without warning for the second strikes. To determine the composition of those surviving arsenals, simulations were coded and run to assess the survivability of the Russian mobile ICBMs and both countries’ silos. In addition to standard counterforce targets, the scenarios included counter-recovery targets consisting of oil refineries and pipelines, shipping ports, and high voltage (HV) transformers to eliminate the U.S. supply of petroleum products and blackout the electrical grid. Beyond infrastructure damage, the blast fatalities and injuries were calculated using NUKEMAP. Though varying in values, all three scenarios resulted in catastrophic damages and highlighted areas for further consideration. This study showed that deep arsenal reductions are possible while maintaining deterrence, the role and necessity of the U.S. ICBMs should be evaluated, and grid security and oil dependence should be addressed.

Bio:

Natalie Montoya is a Technical Associate in the Laboratory for Nuclear Security and Policy in the Department of Nuclear Science & Engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Previously, Natalie was the 2021 – 2022 James C. Gaither Junior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She holds a Bachelor’s degree in nuclear engineering with minors in energy studies and Japanese from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Marina Favaro

Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, University of Hamburg

Abstract:

The military applications of a new generation of technologies have given rise to significant concerns regarding their potential impact on international stability and human security. Meanwhile, decision makers who aim to mitigate these concerns through arms control measures face an uphill battle: the speed of technological innovation, the unclear impact of emerging technologies, and intensifying military-technological competition between the United States and Russia and China are impeding effective arms control for emerging military technologies. This study is the capstone of a one-year study with the objective of forecasting the impact of emerging technologies on international stability and human security. It uses original data to answer three questions: 1. What impacts are emerging technologies likely to have on arms race stability, crisis stability, and humanitarian principles up to 2040? 2. Which emerging technologies show similarities in terms of impact? 3. When will the impact of these technologies become most acute?

Bio:

Marina Favaro is a Research Fellow in the 'Arms Control & Emerging Technologies' Research Programme at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH) at the University of Hamburg. From 2020 to 2021, Marina managed the Emerging Technologies research programme at the London think tank BASIC and worked as a researcher at the Centre for Science and Security Studies (CSSS) at King’s College London. Before that, Marina worked as an Analyst at RAND Europe. She holds a Master’s degree in international relations and politics from the University of Cambridge and a postgraduate certificate in applied data science.

Igor Moric

Princeton University

Zoom link: https://mit.zoom.us/j/93348435755

Abstract:

There are now more than 4,000 operational man-made satellites in orbit, and it is estimated that this number could rise to 50,000 within the next 10 years. Among these are a large number of Earth observation satellites operated by private companies from around the world. The rise of satellite imagery providers is fueled by advancements of technology, increased demand for data, and cheaper space launches. New systems have significantly improved capabilities in terms of ground resolution and persistence of coverage and most importantly, their data is available to the public. Based on my paper on “Capabilities of Commercial Satellite Earth Observation Systems and Applications for Nuclear Verification and Monitoring,” the talk will examine major currently operational observation constellations, present a simulation of their coverage over territories of states with nuclear programs, and explore some applications for nuclear verification and monitoring.

Bio:

Igor Moric is a Postdoctoral Research Associate in the Program on Science and Global Security (SGS) at Princeton University. Prior to joining Princeton, he worked as a postdoctoral researcher on the MIMAC and PandaX dark matter detectors at Tsinghua University in Beijing and SJTU in Shanghai, respectively. During his PhD at CNES and Paris Sorbonne he worked on characterization and optimization of the space atomic clock PHARAO. He also holds an advanced master in “Space Systems Engineering” from ISAE-SUPAERO in Toulouse.

Pavel Podvig

Zoom link: https://mit.zoom.us/j/99035408093

Abstract: This presentation describes an approach to nuclear disarmament verification that is designed to avoid having to deal with sensitive information about nuclear weapons or weapon-related fissile materials. In elimination of warheads, this approach relies on verifying the absence of nuclear weapons in weapon storage facilities. In dealing with weapon-usable fissile materials, the deferred verification arrangement proposes a mechanism that would allow nuclear-armed states to declare the amount of fissile material that they possess and, most importantly, do it in a verifiable way. These approaches could be used in a variety of situations, from removal of non-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula to verifying declarations in a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and disarmament in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

Bio: Pavel Podvig is an independent analyst based in Geneva, where he runs his research project, "Russian Nuclear Forces." He is also a Senior Researcher at the UN Institute for Disarmament Research and a researcher with the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University. His current research focuses on the Russian strategic forces and nuclear weapons complex, as well as technical and political aspects of nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament, missile defense, and U.S.-Russian arms control process. Pavel Podvig is a member of the International Panel on Fissile Materials. He has a physics degree from MIPT and PhD in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations.

Manuel Kreutle

University of Hamburg

Abstract: The experimental configurations present during the 2019 International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) demonstration at the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre SCK CEN in Mol are used for benchmarking Monte Carlo simulations conducted with Geant4, KENO, MCNP and openMC. Neutron multiplication factors, (a,n) emissions and neutron flux densities are calculated. Results are compared to contribute to the validation of Geant4 neutron physics in fissile material systems and for nuclear disarmament verification simulations.

Neutron multiplication factors obtained with Geant4 are in good agreement with other codes while small deviations between the (a,n) simulation codes are observed. Geant4's neutron flux densities lay within a margin of 10% with respect to the other codes. Modeling of thermal neutron scattering behavior leads to considerable differences between all of the codes but an absence of absorption resonance "footprints" in moderated neutron spectra is observed for Geant4 which calls for further evaluation.

Bio: Manuel Kreutle has studied physics in Heidelberg and Hamburg. He joined the field of nuclear disarmament verification in 2018 and is currently working as research assistant at the University of Hamburg, Germany. He has been participating in the 2019 IPDNV measurement campaign at the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre in Mol and was part of the organizers team of the Franco-German NuDiVe exercise in 2019 as well as the NuDiVe 2022 exercise. Besides that, he has been working on Monte Carlo simulations with Geant4 in this context. He will be joining the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University as PhD student in fall 2022.

Christopher Fichtlscherer

University of Hamburg

Abstract:
Nuclear verification often relies on measuring the radiation signatures of warheads and fissile material. Such radiation signatures include gamma and neutron emissions from decay (passive) and particles resulting from induced reactions (active measurements). While research often focuses on measurement technologies, the radiation signatures themselves are rarely studied. Could actors who imitate these signatures compromise nuclear disarmament or non-proliferation processes? Furthermore, a deeper understanding of these signatures can support the search for new methods to ensure treaty obligations are fulfilled without revealing sensitive information.

Bio: Christopher Fichtlscherer has been a researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg since March 2021 and works on the DSF-funded project “Nuclear Warhead Authentication Based on Gamma and Neutron Emissions - How to Discourage Cheating?” He studied mathematics and physics in Darmstadt, Stockholm, and Hamburg and graduated with distinction. Since then, he has been working on his Ph.D. in the “Nuclear Verification and Disarmament” research group at RWTH Aachen. He has completed research stays in Vienna (Institute of Security and Risk Sciences), Daejeon (Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology), and Princeton (Program on Science and Global Security).

Rachel Carr

Assistant Professor of Physics, US Naval Academy

Abstract:
For decades, physicists have used neutrinos from nuclear reactors to advance basic science. These pursuits have inspired many ideas for applications of neutrino detectors in nuclear energy and security. While developments in neutrino science are now making some of these ideas technically feasible, it has not been clear how practically they mesh with the needs, budgets, and other constraints of end users such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. In 2019, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation R&D commissioned a community study on this question. The study, called Nu Tools, included extensive interviews with over 40 nuclear security and energy professionals. Perhaps surprisingly, these experts do see potential niches for neutrino detectors, but not in the places neutrino physicists have often seen them. This talk will review the Nu Tools study and findings, available in full at: https://nutools.ornl.gov/, with a focus on applications in future regional nuclear agreements.

Bio:
Rachel Carr is an Assistant Professor of Physics at the US Naval Academy in Annapolis, MD. She was previously a Pappalardo Fellow in Physics and Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at MIT, as well as a legislative fellow in the office of Sen. Feinstein. Beginning with her PhD research at Columbia, her scientific focus has been the experimental study of neutrinos.

Julien de Troullioud de Lanversin

Managing the Atom Program, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University

Zoom link: https://mit.zoom.us/j/97004224508

Abstract: Plutonium and tritium are both essential components of modern nuclear weapons. While plutonium is used for fission, the fusion of tritium with deuterium provides a burst of neutron that boosts the fission yield of nuclear weapons. As such, the production and stockpiles of these two elements should be at the core of any efforts to cap and eliminate nuclear arsenals in an irreversible manner. Production in nuclear reactors is the most effective route to acquire tritium, and the only path for plutonium production. Using nuclear reactor physics and modelling, it is possible to estimate how much plutonium and tritium countries with nuclear programs have produced. Furthermore, nuclear reactor simulations can also be used for nuclear archaeology efforts, by which the past operation of a reactor is deduced via on-site isotopic measurements and reactor modelling. This work presents efforts to develop new, open-source software to model nuclear reactor physics, its application to reactors in Israel and North Korea to estimate plutonium and tritium production, and its application for new nuclear archaeology methods.

Bio: A nuclear engineer by training, Julien applies his knowledge on nuclear science and technologies to investigate issues related to nuclear non-proliferation and arms control, advanced reactor technologies as well as policies around nuclear energy. As the project lead for the open-source nuclear reactor physics code ONIX, he also works to promote open-source and transparent scientific tools that can contribute to research in nuclear security and nuclear technologies. Julien received a scientific education both in China and the U.S., and is also interested in studying how the rise of Chinese science affects international collaboration in science (such as the U.S.-China scientific partnership) as well as its impact on the nuclear industry and global nuclear governance.

Julien is currently a research fellow at the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard's Belfer Center and was previously a nuclear security postdoctoral fellow at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) from 2019 to 2021. He was part of the Science and Global Security research team at Princeton University from 2014 to 2019 and regularly contributes to projects with the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM). Julien holds a Ph.D. in Applied Physics from Princeton University, a M.Sc. in Nuclear Science and Technology from Tsinghua University Beijing, and a Diplôme d'Ingénieur (M.Sc. and B.Sc.Eng.) from Ecole Centrale de Marseille.

Sebastien Philippe

Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University

Abstract: Between 1966 and 1996, France conducted 193 atmospheric and underground nuclear weapons tests in Polynesia in the Southern Pacific Ocean, profoundly affecting the environment and the health of local people and of French veterans involved in the testing program. The talk, based on the newly published book Toxique and the related website Moruroa Files, presents the results of a two-year long study involving extensive computer simulations of nuclear test fallouts, dozens of interviews in France and Polynesia, and 2000 pages of declassified French government documents, revealing the consequences of French nuclear testing in the Pacific and the struggle of local communities and veterans to seek justice and compensation.

Bio: Dr. Sebastien Philippe is an Associate Research Scholar with the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University's School of Public and International Affairs. He is also an associate faculty with the Nuclear Knowledges Program at Sciences-Po, Paris. His research focuses on nuclear proliferation, arms control, and verification. His book "Toxique" on the legacy of French nuclear testing in the Pacific, co-authored with journalist Tomas Statius, is finalist for the 2021 Albert Londres prize, the French equivalent of the Pulitzer prize. Previously, Sebastien was a Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and worked in the French Ministry of Defense. He has a PhD in Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering from Princeton.

There is also a video describing this work, which won the 2021 @DIGawards for best investigative journalism (short video format).

David Wright

Laboratory for Nuclear Science and Policy, MIT

Zoom link: https://mit.zoom.us/j/92752596480

Abstract: This talk will follow on to the webinar Cameron Tracy gave in this series last October, which was based on this paper: http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs28tracy.pdf The current webinar will begin by discussing the evolution of the US hypersonics program and its mission since 2000. This shift in mission has led to programs to develop hypersonic weapons having ranges up to a couple thousand kilometers, rather than the longer range systems envisioned previously. The talk will discuss how the technical issues raised in the above paper for longer range hypersonic weapons apply to these shorter range systems. One focus will be on what is required for these weapons to evade missile defenses, and how that can affect their detectability to satellite sensors.

Bio: David Wright is a Research Affiliate in the MIT Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering’s Laboratory for Nuclear Security and Policy. From 1992 to 2020 he was a researcher with the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, serving as co-director of the program from 2002 to 2020. Previously he held research positions in the Defense and Arms Control/Security Studies Program at MIT, the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, and the Federation of American Scientists. He received his PhD in theoretical condensed matter physics from Cornell University in 1983 and worked as a research physicist until 1988. He has worked on arms control and international security issues, researching technical aspects of nuclear weapons policy, missile defense systems, missile proliferation, hypersonic weapons, and space weapons.

From 1990 to 2019, he was a primary organizer of the International Summer Symposiums on Science and World Affairs, which fostered cooperation among scientists around the world working on arms control and security issues. He was a co-recipient of the 2001 American Physical Society’s Joseph A. Burton Forum Award for his arms control research and his work with international scientists. He is a Fellow of the American Physical Society.

Bernadette Cogswell

Center for Neutrino Physics, Virginia Tech

Zoom link: https://mit.zoom.us/j/99506196663

Abstract: Analogous to the physics behind solid state nuclear track detectors used in dosimetry, coherent elastic neutrino nucleus scattering (CEvNS) in crystals results in nuclear recoils, which in turn permanently damages the host crystal by the creation of damage tracks and vacancies in the lattice. In certain types of crystals these vacancies are optically active and can be individually detected by laser-induced fluorescence, a technique which has recently been demonstrated in applications in quantum computing.

This allows for entirely passive antineutrino detectors, whose information about the history of an antineutrino source, such as a nuclear reactor, can be read-out at a later time off-site. We present detailed simulations of the damage creation in various possible crystals. Early results indicate that 100 grams of detector mass are sufficient to detect reactor powers below 50 megawatts-thermal, even in the presence of sea-level cosmic ray neutron backgrounds. Given the very small (fits in the palm of the hand) detector size, sensitivity to fissile material production in reactor cores, and possibility of off-site read-out, such passive crystal CEvNS detectors may be uniquely suited to reactor safeguards.

Bio: Dr. Bernadette K. Cogswell is a Research Scientist at the Virginia Tech University Center for Neutrino Physics. She has previously been a Dame Kathleen Ollerenshaw Fellow at the University of Manchester’s School of Physics and Astronomy and a Postdoctoral Research Associate at Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security. She works on technical and policy issues at the intersection of particle physics and nuclear nonproliferation. Dr. Cogswell is also an Associate Editor for the journal Science & Global Security. Her current research focuses on antineutrino detectors for treaty verification and safeguards and issues surrounding plutonium disposition.

Sharon Weiner

School of International Service, American University

Moritz Kütt

Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, University of Hamburg

Zoom link: https://mit.zoom.us/j/98112260157

Abstract:

Research on foreign policy decision making and behavioral economics argues that people frequently use heuristics, past experience, and emotion to insert significant irrationality into their decision making. This is especially true in situations of extreme uncertainty and stress. Decisions about nuclear use are typically characterized by both factors. Yet, deterrence theory assumes that decision makers can (and need to) rationally assess costs and benefits of their actions, including outcomes as incomprehensible as global nuclear war. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) - one leg of the U.S. nuclear triad - complicate the situation even further: Because their vulnerable to an enemy's first strike, nuclear strategy includes launch on warning, where missiles can be launched within minutes. This increases the chances a nuclear exchange will result from misperceptions or misunderstandings.

We will present and demonstrate a Virtual Reality (VR) experience simulating crisis decision making involving ICBMs. In our research project, the VR experience will be used as the basis for controlled observations and a set of experiments to better understand the decision making behavior that is likely in a nuclear crisis.

Bio:

Sharon K. Weiner is Associate Professor at the School of International Service at American University. Her research, teaching, and policy engagement are at the intersection of organizational politics and U.S. national security and focus on nuclear weapons strategy and force structure as well as civil-military relations. A 2018-2020 Carnegie Fellow, Weiner’s current project looks at the relationship between conceptions of deterrence and bureaucratic structure, processes, and culture. Her previous experience includes the White House Office of Management and Budget, the Joint Staff, and both houses of Congress. She holds a PhD in Political Science from MIT’s Security Studies Program.

Moritz Kütt is a Senior Researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. In his research, he develops new approaches and innovative tools for verification of nuclear arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament agreements. Besides classical instruments, he studies how new technologies (e.g. Open Source Software, Virtual Reality, Robotics) can be used for existing and future verification tasks, and to improve our understanding of nuclear deterrence. Prior to his time in Hamburg, he has been multiple times at Princeton University's Program on Science and Global Security. He holds a PhD in Physics from Technische Universtiät Darmstadt, Germany.

Areg Danagoulian

Nuclear Science and Engineering, MIT

The Zoom link for this webinar is: https://mit.zoom.us/j/94603962985

Abstract: Arms control treaties are not sufficient in and of themselves to neutralize the existential threat of the nuclear weapons. Technologies are necessary for verifying the authenticity of the nuclear warheads undergoing dismantlement before counting them towards a treaty partner’s obligation.

We have developed a neutron-based concept that uses observations of isotope-specific nuclear transitions to authenticate a warhead's fissile components. Most actinides such as uranium and plutonium exhibit unique sets of nuclear resonances when interacting with eV neutrons. When measured, these resonances produce isotope-specific features in the spectral data, thus creating an isotopic-geometric “fingerprint” of an object. All information in these measurements is encrypted in the physical domain through a process called physical cryptography. Using Monte Carlo simulations and experimental proof-of-concept measurements these techniques are shown to reveal no isotopic or geometric information about the weapon, while readily detecting hoaxing attempts. The talk will discuss the policy context, the concept of the experimental techniques, along with results from simulation and experimental measurements.

Bio: Areg Danagoulian is Associate Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering at MIT. He received his PhD in Experimental Nuclear Physics from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, where he used Compton scattering at 2-6 GeV to probe the proton's internal structure and understand how it couples to external excitations. Following his PhD, he worked at Los Alamos as a postdoctoral researcher, and then as a senior scientist at Passport Systems, Inc. (PSI), where he focused on the development of Prompt Neutron from Photofission (PNPF) to rapidly detect shielded fissionable materials in commercial cargo traffic. Areg's current research interests focus on nuclear physics applications in nuclear security, such areas nuclear nonproliferation, technologies for treaty verification, nuclear safeguards, and cargo security.

Robert Kelley and Vitaly Fedchenko

Link to webinar recording

Abstract: There have been many open-source publications estimating the size of the North Korean nuclear weapons arsenal, especially triggered by each of the six nuclear tests conducted between 2006 and 2017. Up to this point these publications relied on an assumption that all Highly Enriched Uraium (HEU) and plutonium stocks in North Korea are allocated to fission-only or boosted single-stage weapons. Such studies normally begin with estimates of stocks of fissile material – in this case, plutonium and HEU – in the North Korean military stockpile, assume how much plutonium or HEU would have to be used in each weapon, and arrive at a number of weapons in an arsenal by dividing the first value by the second one.

In the 14 years that have passed since the first nuclear test in October 2006, estimates of North Korean nuclear arsenal became more complicated. On 3 September 2017, Pyongyang conducted a nuclear test that was accepted by many observers as its first and only test of a thermonuclear explosive device. The methodology outlined above uses the estimates of fissile material mass required for fission weapons but does not account for the material requirements of thermonuclear weapons.

We used the publicly known characteristics of US weapons to develop a new method to calculate fissile material requirements of North Korean thermonuclear weapons. They show that North Korean thermonuclear secondaries are likely to require about three times more highly enriched uranium than a simple fission weapon, and this finding clarifies the possible size and composition of the country’s arsenal.

Bios: Robert Kelley is Distinguished Research Fellow at SIPRI. He is a veteran in the nuclear weapon and disarmament field with over 35 years in the US Department of Energy nuclear weapons complex, most recently at Los Alamos.

Vitaly Fedchenko is a Senior Researcher with the SIPRI European Security Programme, responsible for nuclear security issues and the political, technological and educational dimensions of nuclear arms control and non-proliferation.